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AUTHORIZED DISPOSITIONS OF OFFENDERS
UNDER THE NEW KENTUCKY PENAL CODE
There has recently been a growing public concern over the manner
in which convicted criminals are treated in our society. Numerous
newspaper stories, magazine articles and television specials have
probed, examined, and criticized the present system that, to varying
degrees, seeks to rehabilitate, punish and deter those who have com-
mitted serious offenses against society. The prison riots of late, the
high rate of recidivism among convicted criminals,1 and the expense
of keeping a man in prison2 are convincing arguments that penal
reform is needed. A number of states, including Kentucky, have re-
sponded by enacting revised criminal statutes which incorporate
modern theories of penology.
The new Kentucky Penal Code makes several important changes
in the laws pertaining to the authorized penalties for offenders.
Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to give the reader a working
grasp of the law of sentencing. It is important that practicing attorneys
and trial judges understand the interrelationship of the various sections
and the wide range of sanctions available under the new law. Indeed,
since the drafters of the Kentucky Penal Code stress the importance
of flexibility in the alternatives available to the sentencing authority,3
it would seem that a necessary prerequisite to enlightened sentencing
practices is a thorough familiarity with the provisions of the new law.
Besides the changes made in the law itself, the new Penal Code
adopts a modern approach to the implementation of the sections on
sentencing. The drafters of the Code have apparently decided that the
primary objective of criminal sanctions should be the rehabilitation
of the offender. While elements of retribution, deterrence, and
neutralization, the other generally accepted theories of sentencing, are
present in the new Code provisions, the predominant theme is that
1 See PmrmNr's COMMnSSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE THE CHALLENGE OF CrUmE IN A Fnr- Socixry 45 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as PRESEDENT'S COMMISSION, THE CHALLENGE OF CPME].
2 Statistics indicate that it costs on an annual national average, $1966 to im-
prison a felon, $1046 for inmates of local institutions, and $3613 for every juvenile.
KmENrucmy COin sSON ON LAW ENFORCEmENT AND CrImE PREvENON, KENTUC Y
JAILs 2 (1969). In Kentucky, the annual average cost of keeping a person con-
fined in a local jail is $1116.90. Id. at 30.
3 See KENTUCKY LEGISLATIVE REsFicH COMMISSION, KmruCKy PENAL CODE
§§ 3405-3625, Commentary (Final Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as LRC]
wherein the term flexibility is repeatedly used by the drafters in describing the
significance of the various sections of the new code.
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rehabilitation is more effective and more economical.4 It is hoped that,
by reforming the criminal and turning him into a useful, law-abiding
member of society, the wasting of human resources can be avoided
and real progress can be made towards reducing crime.5
Yet the goals of even the most enlightened sentencing code are
more easily stated than accomplished. The sentencing authority, gen-
erally the trial judge, must have at his disposal a sufficient diversity of
sanctions, and he must be willing to impose the penalty which will
achieve the best result for both the criminal and society.8 The auto-
matic sentence for various crimes, without giving due consideration to
alternatives such as probation or a fine which might be more appro-
priate in the individual case, should be avoided. Indeed, it can be said
that the success of sentencing depends upon a combination of modern
enabling legislation,7 skilled trial judges8 and adequate correctional
facilities.9 While the latter two elements require time, expense, and
the commitment of many individuals, the Kentucky General Assembly
has done its part towards an improved system of criminal sentencing
by enacting the new Penal Code.
Jury Sentencing vs. judge Sentencing
One important aspect of pre-existing law has been retained in the
new Code. Aligning itself with the minority view, Kentucky will retain
jury sentencing. 10 Under this process the jury makes the initial de-
termination of the maximum sentence at the same time it renders its
verdict. Most jurisdictions vest this responsibility in the trial judge,
4 LRC § 3505, Commentary. See generally Palmore, Sentencing and Cor-
rection: The Black Sheep of Criminal Law, 26 FED. PROBATION Dec. 1972, at 6-7
[hereinafter cited as Pahmore, Sentencing and Correction] and Note, Sentencing:
The Good, The Bad and The Enlightened, 57 K. L.J. 456, 458-59 (1969).nJ Palmore, Sentencing and Correction, supra note 4, at 6-7.
O ABA PRoJECT ON Mn~xM STAN'DARmDS For CRIMNAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PaOCanui-tES § 2.1(b) (Tentative
Draft 1967) [hereinafter cited as ABA, SERNrE CInc ALTERNAV~AESI states:
The sentencing court should be provided in all cases with a wide
range of alternatives, with gradations of supervisory, supportive and cus-
todial facilities at its disposal so as to permit a sentence appropriate for
each individual case.
7 ABA, SF.NTENCiNo ALTERNATIvES supra note 6, at § 2.1, Commentary b-e
at 50-55.
8 "Wise and fair sentencing requires intuition insight, and imagination; at
present it is less a science than an art. In the final analysis good sentencing de-
pends on good judges." PR~smENT's Co MnssIoN, TrE CHALLENGE oF CRIM ,
supra note 1, at 141.
9 For a study of the present state of our correctional institutions and recom-
mendations for improvements in the area of corrections, see PRESIDENT's COMMIS-
SION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 158-85.10 Ky. AcTs. ch. 385 § 265 (1972) [ch. 385 is hereinafter cited as KYPC],
Proposed Ky. REv. STAT. § 435A.1-060 [hereinafter cited as [KRS]l; LRC & 3430,
Commentary; Ky. R. Cium. P. 9.84.
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and indeed recent opinion has been nearly unanimous that jury
sentencing should be abolished in non-capital cases.
There are several persuasive arguments against jury sentencing in
non-capital cases. Most often cited is the fact that juries lack the
expertise in sentencing, and thus are not capable of consistently pre-
scribing the penalty which will be most effective. While a judge
brings with him to every trial a wealth of knowledge and experience
in the treatment of criminals, a jury is composed of laymen most of
whom have no experience whatsoever. Further, the constantly chang-
ing membership of juries creates a greater chance of disparity in
sentencing from case to case involving the same type of crime.' 2
Besides the general lack of expertise, a jury does not have before
it all the information about the defendant which it needs to make a
truly informed decision. Though the jurors may be able to gain some
insight into the character of the defendant during the trial, the rules
of evidence preclude them from receiving all information relevant to
sentencing. Certainly, the jury has no equivalent to the presentence
report available to the trial judge.13 A possible solution would be to
have a separate sentencing trial at which all relevant data would be
admissible. This suggestion, however, has been rejected as both too
time-consuming and too costly.14
It is also claimed by critics of jury sentencing that jurors are more
likely to be influenced by passion or prejudice. Thus, one defendant
might receive a stiffer penalty than another solely because of the
jury's attitude toward the defendant, or perhaps his attorney. Although
these allegations are difficult to substantiate, certainly such factors as
the defendant's race, appearance, and conduct must to some extent
enter into the sentencing decision as well as the decision of guilt or
innocence. 15
A less obvious weakness in jury sentencing is the possibility that
the added responsibility of fixing the penalty might interfere with
the jury's primary function of determining the innocence or guilt of
the accused. Critics argue that under jury sentencing jurors are able
11 ABA, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at § 1.1, Commentary a-b
at 43-47; PRESIDENT'S COMZMSSION, THE CHATLENGE OF CRIm, supra note 1, at
145; Note, Sentencing: The Good, The Bad and The Enlightened, supra note 4, at
473-80.
12 See ABA, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at § 1.1, Commentary
b at 44-47; Palmore, Sentencing and Correction, supra note 4, at 718.
13 Id.
14 See text accompanying notes 44-50 infra.
15 See Note, Sentencing: The Good, The Bad and The Enlightened, supra
note 4, at 473-76.
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to compromise on a defendant's guilt in return for a lighter sentence.16
The seriousness of such practice is apparent. An accused may be
denied his right to be convicted only by a unanimous verdict because
of a jury's desire to expedite a decision.
Most jurisdictions, including the federal system, have adopted
judge sentencing. Under this procedure, after the defendant is found
guilty by judge or jury, the trial judge must either grant probation
or sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment within the limits
set by statute. Once the offender is sentenced to prison, his release prior
to the expiration of the set term is determined by the parole board.' 7
Since the actual amount of time the offender spends in prison is in the
discretion of the parole authorities, the real distinction between jury
sentencing and judge sentencing lies in who must designate the maxi-
mum term. The most attractive aspect of judge sentencing is that
most trial judges have had considerable experience in sentencing
criminals and have developed a certain amount of expertise in the
field. 18
Another proposed alternative to jury sentencing is the procedure
which has been adopted in California.' 9 There, once an offender is
found guilty, the trial judge must either grant probation or sentence
the person to the maximum term of imprisonment under the applicable
statute. The initial determination of the length of the imprisonment
and such matters as parole and parole revocation are the responsibility
of an Adult Authority staffed by appointed officials. The effectiveness
of the Adult Authority depends upon the competency of the members.20
Nevertheless, this method has several distinct advantages over both
jury sentencing and judge sentencing. In the first place, the Authority
is not as subject to community pressures as is a trial judge. Further,
the decisions of the Adult Authority are the result of the deliberation
of several persons rather than being a conclusion drawn by one
individual. Finally, this procedure improves on the process of jury
16 ABA, SENTENCING ALTEmATrVE, supra note 6, at § 1.1, Commentary b
at 46.
17KYPC § 265(3) [KRS § 435A.1-060(3)] provides that the actual time of
release within the maximum set by the judge or jury shall be determined by pro-
cedures established elsewhere by law. Thus, the sentencer sets only the maximum
term of imprisonment while the actual time of release is determined by the Parole
Board. Unlike the federal system, the jury or judge cannot impose a minimum
term of imprisonment. See LRC § 3430, Commentary.
18 See note 12 supra.
'9 See LRC § 3430, Commentary; Palmore, Sentencing and Correction supra
note 4, at 9-10; Note, Sentencing: The Good, The Bad and The Enlightened, supra




sentencing in that the Authority has more relevant information before
it than does a jury; has more time to consider such information and to
consider a proper punishment; and has developed an expertise and
uniform policy of sentencing which the lay jury lacks.21
While a majority of jurisdictions and most commentators in the field
of criminal justice and penology are opposed to the practice, there are
several valid reasons supporting the decision to retain jury sentencing
in Kentucky. Proponents of jury sentencing observe that trial judges
are often prone to callousness towards criminals and are equally
susceptible to the influence of their passions and prejudices. In this
respect a jury, consisting of a number of individuals, is preferable
since there is less chance that an entire jury will be swayed by outside
influences. Likewise, jurors, who serve only occasionally, are relatively
anonymous and are less subject to public pressure as a result of their
jury room decisions than are elected judges. Finally, some theorize that
where judges are charged with the responsibility of sentencing, juries
may be tempted to acquit a guilty defendant for fear that the judge
might impose a harsh penalty.22
Although the weight of authority is in favor of judge sentencing
in non-capital cases, the opposite is true in capital cases. There are
sound reasons for having a jury determine the sentence where the
death penalty is a possibility. The decision to impose the death
penalty should be made by a cross-section of the community, thus
reflecting a consensus of the community's sense of justice. Forcing the
jury to make this decision also relieves the trial judge of a tremendous
burden. A further consideration in favor of jury sentencing in capital
cases is the possibility that a jury which does not favor the death
penalty would refuse to convict a defendant if they could not be
assured that the sentence of death would not be imposed.23
Although some believe that the retention of jury sentencing is the
major weakness of this part of the new Penal Code,24 this weakness is
not critical. Most errors committed by the jury are subject to cor-
rection by the trial judge or by the parole board.25 If a jury sets a
2 1 LRC § 3430, Commentary. One of the most important features of the
California correctional process is the individualized treatment of the offender, with
emphasis on psychiatric therapy, which is aimed towards preparing the individual
for life beyond the prison walls. See Palmore, Sentencing and Correction, supra
note 4, at 9-10.
22 See ABA, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at § 1.1, Commentary b
at 44; Moreland, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Probation and Parole, 57 Ky. L.J.51, 56-57 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Moreland, Model Penal Code].2 8 ABA, SENTENCING ALTFRNATrIVEs, supra note 6, at § 1.1, Commentary c at
47-48.24 LRC § 3430, Commentary.
25 Id.
[Vol. 61
PENAL CODE-DIsPOSITIONS OF FENDEBS
term of imprisonment which, though within the statutory limits, is
deemed too harsh, the trial judge is empowered under Kentucky Penal
Code § 266 [hereinafter cited as KYPC], Proposed Ky. Rev. Stat. §
435A.1-070 [hereinafter cited as [KRS] ], to modify the jury's sentence
and to fix a different maximum sentence. Moreover, if the judge is
convinced that imprisonment would be inappropriate, he may grant
probation or conditional discharge in lieu of imposing the jury's
sentence. 26 Finally, since all sentences for felonies are indeterminate,
the parole authorities are empowered to release the offender at any
time after he is turned over to the Department of Corrections regard-
less of the maximum term set by the jury.27
The only error which cannot be cured is where the jury returns a
sentence which is too lenient.28 Neither the trial court nor the parole
board can increase the maximum term of imprisonment set by the
jury. Yet, despite this flaw, the drafters of the Code have determined
that the advantages of jury sentencing outweigh the disadvantages.
Authorized Dispositions: Generally
A major improvement made in the new penal code is the classifica-
tion of all felonies and misdemeanors.2 9 Under the existing law each
criminal statute prescribes the sanction to be imposed. The problem
inherent in such a system is that one offender can be punished more
severely than another who has engaged in substantially the same type
of conduct in terms of harm done.30 The fact that, at present, one
who steals up to ninety-nine dollars in cash or property is subject to
imprisonment for a maximum of twelve months while one who takes a
two dollar chicken is liable to serve up to five years,3 ' may be a
source of amusement to some, but it is certainly not indicative of a
modem system of criminal justice. By classifying all felonies and
misdemeanors according to their seriousness, the Code achieves a
more uniform, rational, and equitable sentencing structure.3 2
All felonies defined within the Code are placed in one of four
classes: A, B, C, or D felonies. 33 There are three classes of mis-
26 KYPC § 264 [KRS § 435A.1-040].27 See note 17 supra.
2 8 LRC § 3430, Commentary.
20 KYPC § 261 [KRS § 435A.1-0101.
30 See Lawson, Criminal Law Revision in Kentucky: Part I-Homicide and
Assault, 58 Ky. L.J. 242, 244 (1970).31 Compare Ky. Rxv. STAT. 433.230 (1973) [hereinafter cited as KRS] with
KRS § 433.250; see Note, Classification and Degrees of Offenses-An Approach to
Modernity, 57 Ky. L.J. 491 (1969).
32 See LRC § 3405, Commentary.
= KYPC § 261 [KRS § 435A.1-0101.
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demeanors: Class A, Class B, or Violations.34 Since the Code has
retained jury sentencing the drafters decided that a four-tier classifica-
tion of felonies was necessary in order to limit the jury's range in fixing
maximum sentences. This same reason prompted the drafters to divide
non-felonies into three categories.35
The authorized punishments for those convicted of Class A felonies
are death, life imprisonment, imprisonment for some other inde-
terminate period not less than twenty years, or a fine."6 Additionally,
in one specific case, the sentence of life imprisonment without privilege
of parole is authorized. This punishment may only be prescribed in
first degree rape convictions in which the victim was under twelve
years of age or in which the victim received serious physical injuries.37
Originally, the final draft of the code had provided that life without
parole would be an authorized punishment in all Class A felony cases.38
The legislators, however, opted to limit the application of this sentence
to the one particular crime.
As enacted, this provision authorizing life imprisonment without
parole departs from existing law very little. Under present criminal
statutes in Kentucky, such a sentence is authorized for but one crime,
the rape of a girl over twelve.39 Thus, as the law now reads, one con-
victed of raping a girl over twelve is subject to being imprisoned for
life without the possibility of parole, while one convicted for the rape
of a girl under twelve cannot be denied parole.40 The Code cures
this discrepancy by prescribing the more severe penalty, life imprison-
ment without parole, for the more serious offense, rape of a girl under
twelve.
It should also be noted that the sentence of life imprisonment
without privilege of parole cannot be imposed on juveniles, even when
tried as adults. In two recent cases, Anderson v. Commonwealth,41
and Workman v. Commonwealth,42 the Court of Appeals held that
this sentence, as applied to juveniles, is unconstitutional as a form of
34 Id.
35 LRC § 3405, Commentary. See also ABA, SENTENCING ALTENATVES, supra
note 6, at § 2.1 Commentary at 52. Some states have established five classifications
of felonies, and others three degrees of felonies. Likewise, some jurisdictions have
two types of misdemeanors while others have three types.
36 KYPC § 263 [KRS § 435A.1-030l.
3 7 KYPC § 263 [KRS § 435A.1-030]; KYPC § 264 [KRS § 435A.1-0401. The
question whether the Parole Board is bouna by such a sentence is seemingly answered
in KRS § 439.840 which empowers the board to release on parole such persons
as are eligible for parole.3 s LRC § 3415.3 9 KRS § 435.090.
40 Compare KRS § 435.090 with K.S § 435.080.
41465 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1971).
42 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968).
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cruel and unusual punishment. The Court reasoned that, since the
objective of this sentence is to isolate from society the dangerous
and incorrigible criminals, such a penalty is improper for juveniles,
incorrigibility being inconsistent with youth. 43
With regard to the sentences of death and life imprisonment
without privilege of parole, the General Assembly rejected the pro-
posal that a separate proceeding be held to determine whether these
sentences should be imposed. The final draft of the Penal Code had
provided for a separate sentencing hearing, after the determination
of guilt, at which evidence is presented to the jury in order to aid
them in deciding whether to impose the death penalty or life imprison-
ment without privilege of parole, rather than some other inde-
terminate sentence of imprisonment. 4 The main feature of this pro-
cedure, as opposed to the system wherein the jury must determine
the sentence when they determine guilt, is that much more data
relevant to making an informed sentencing decision is available to the
jury. When the issues of guilt and punishment are resolved in a single
trial, the rules of evidence deny the jury much information concerning
the circumstances of the crime, the defendant's background, character,
and other mitigating or aggravating matters.45 Another argument in
support of separate sentencing trials is that the jury can more ably
attend to the determination of guilt and is less likely to engage in
jury nullification or jury bargaining.46
However, those who favor the single verdict procedure over the
split verdict system, and a large majority of jurisdictions do prefer the
former,47 claim that a separate proceeding would be too costly and
time-consuming. 48 Moreover, it has been suggested that these "second
trials" would raise additional complex problems such as: who would
prove what and what should the standard of proof be? Would the
jury have absolute discretion at this stage or could their decision be
reviewed for error? Could the trial judge direct a verdict of life
imprisonment at this stage, if the evidence clearly indicated that
43 Id. at 378.44 LRC § 3440. See MODEL PrNAL CODE § 201.6, Comments 5-6 at 74-79
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
45 Id.; see Note, Bifurcating Florida's Capital Trials: Two Steps are Better
Than One, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 127, 146-51 (1971) and Comment, The Constitu-
tionality and Desirability of Bifurcated Trials and Sentencing Standards, 2 SETON
HALL L. REV. 427, 428-29 (1971).
46 Note, Bifurcating Florida's Capital Trials: Two Steps are Better Than One,
supra note 45, at 147.
47 Only six states have adopted the separate sentencing trial procedures:
California, Connecticut, Georgia, New York, Pennsylvania and Texas.48 See Frady v. United States, 348 F.2d 84, 113-16 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Burger,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 909 (1965).
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result? These are several questions which would have to be resolved
if the split verdict procedure were implemented. 49
Perhaps the most effective criticism of the separate sentencing trial
is that it would probably work against the defendant more than it
would work in his favor. Certainly, some defendants would fare better
with a bifurcated trial; but, on the other hand, this procedure is a two-
way street, and while the defendant can offer evidence which would
tend to mitigate his sentence, the prosecutor is given the opportunity
to counter with proof of the defendant's character and history of
prior misconduct. Under the present unitary trial system, a defendant
can, by exercising his right not to testify and taking advantage of the
restrictive rules of evidence, effectively keep from the jury any infor-
mation relating to his character or prior crimes. Therefore, the offender
who has a criminal record and whose character could not withstand
close scrutiny is better protected from the possibility of a sentence
based on passion or prejudice where the jury determines his guilt
and his penalty at the same time.50
It would seem that enlightened sentencing would require that all
relevant information, favorable or disfavorable to the offender, be pre-
sented to the person or persons who must settle upon an appropriate
penalty. The presentence report, which must be prepared and given to
the trial judge before he imposes the sentence in all felony convictions,
serves a similar function. Nevertheless, possibly because they felt that
the additional proceeding would be too expensive or would further
lengthen the time it takes to try a criminal case, or perhaps because
they were concerned that defendants would be prejudiced by a
separate sentencing trial, the General Assembly decided to retain
the present procedure wherein the jury fixes the sentence when they
determine guilt.
Most offenders convicted of serious crimes are sentenced to a term
of imprisonment. The new Code specifies for each class of felonies
the range within which the judge or jury must set the maximum
indeterminate sentence.51 Except where the offender may be sentenced
as a persistent felon, the maximum terms of imprisonment are: for Class
A felonies, not less than twenty years nor more than life imprisonment,
for Class B felonies, not less than ten years nor more than twenty
years; for Class C felonies, not less than five years nor more than ten
years; and for Class D felonies, not less than one year nor more than
49 Id.
50 See Comment, The Constitutionality and Desirability of Bifurcated Trials
and Sentencing Standards, supra note 45, at 429-31.51 KYPC § 265 [KRS § 435A.1-0601.
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five years. Since all felony sentences are indeterminate, the sentencing
authority can only designate the maximum number of years which
may be served. Neither the judge nor the jury can set a mandatory
minimum sentence. 2 Once the offender is turned over to the Depart-
ment of Corrections, the amount of time that he actually serves is
determined by the parole authorities. Thus, although the sentencer
must levy a maximum term of between ten and twenty years for one
convicted of a Class B felony, the amount of time served could be
much less than ten years. This is consistent with the Code's objective
of reforming and rehabilitating the criminal. If rehabilitation is the
primary goal, the actual length of imprisonment, up to the maximum
set by the sentencer, should be determined by those who supervise
and continually re-evaluate the offender's case long after the jury
is dismissed.53
The Code provides that the maximum sentence of imprisonment
shall be twelve months for Class A misdemeanors and nine months
for Class B misdemeanors. 54 In misdemeanor cases the jury or trial
judge sentences the offender to a definite term of imprisonment
in the city or county jail or in a regional correctional institution.55
This, however, does not mean that misdemeanants must serve the
entire sentence. Under existing statutes, which will not be superseded
by the adoption of the Code, misdemeanants may be granted parole,
generally by the county judge.56 Nevertheless, while it is hoped that
felons can be rehabilitated or reformed by serving a sentence in
prison, the drafters of the Code readily acknowledge that, due to
minimal opportunity to individualize punishment or treatment in local
jails, imprisonment for misdemeanor convictions can only be justified
as a deterrent. Indeed, the most notable achievement the Code makes
52 LRC § 3420, Commentary.
53 The MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.06, 6.07, Comment at 24-26 (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1954) sets a minimum sentence which the court shall impose for felony con-
victions. The minimum is raised for sentencing of those who are sentenced to
extended terms as being dangerous or persistent felons. The argument in favor
of allowing the court to designate a minimum sentence is two-fold. In the first
place, minimum sentences are aimed at reassuring the public that dangerous
criminals will be removed from society. Second, it is thought that the legislature
and the courts should retain some control over the actual release of the offender.
See ABA, SENTNciNG ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at § 3.2, Commentary a-g at
143-60.
Nevertheless, beyond the limited minimum sentence, both the Model Penal
Code and the ABA Project support the concept of indeterminate sentences for
felony convictions. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.06, 6.07, Comment at 24-26STent. Draft No. 2, 1954) and ABA, SENTENCING ALTERNATimS, supra note 6, at
3.2, Commentary b at 144.
54 KYPC § 268 [KRS § 435A.1-0901.
55 KYPC § 269 [KRS § 435A.1-100].
56 KRS § 439.175 and KRS § 439.177.
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with regard to the sentencing of misdemeanants is that it divides all
misdemeanors into two classes, which restricts the jury's discretion in
sentencing and should ensure that the punishment matches the
offense.57
Like most criminal codes,58 the new Kentucky Penal Code provides
for the imposition of extended terms of imprisonment for persistent
felons. As defined by KYPC § 267 [KRS § 435A.1-080], a persistent
felony offender is a person over twenty-one years old who stands
convicted of a felony after having previously been convicted of two
or more felonies. In order to be considered a previous felony conviction
for purposes of this section, certain factors must be present. First, the
prior conviction must have carried with it a sentence of at least one
year imprisonment or death. The defendant must have been at least
eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the prior felony.
Finally, the defendant must have been actually imprisoned under
sentence for the prior felony. When the defendant has been convicted
of two or more felonies for which he served concurrent or uninter-
rupted consecutive sentences, these convictions shall constitute only
one prior conviction in computing the necessary two prior felony con-
victions.5 9
These elements indicate that the persistent felony statute will be
applied only in those cases where the offender truly deserves to be
considered an habitual criminal. This classification is aimed primarily
at those individuals who have repeatedly committed felonies and who
have shown a lack of capacity for rehabilitation.60 Indeed, this section
of the Code departs from the general theme of rehabilitation and leans
more toward the protection of society from dangerous individuals.61
Thus, the requirement that the offender be at least twenty-one years
old at the time of the present trial and be no younger than eighteen
years of age when he committed the previous felonies is assurance
that the individual is a dangerous adult. Likewise, the requirement
that the offender must have been imprisoned for each prior felony is
substantiation of his inability to be rehabilitated.62
The sentence which may be imposed pursuant to the persistent
5 See LRC § 3405, Commentary.
58 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.03, Comment at 38-44 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1954).
59 Existing law requires that the two prior offenses be committed progessively.
Thus, the felon must have committed the second offense after he has been con-
victed and has served his sentence for the first offense. Ross v. Commonwealth,
384 S.W.2d 324 (Ky. 1964); Cobb v. Commonwealth, 101 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1936).60 LRC § 3445, Commentary. See generally ABA, SEIN NCING ALTERNATrvEs,
supra note 6, at § 3.3, Commentary a-g at 162-71.61 LRC § 3445, Commentary.
62 Id.
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felony statute depends upon the classification of the felony for which
the defendant presently stands convicted.63 Thus, if the offender is
convicted of a Class B felony, his sentence shall be an indeterminate
term of imprisonment or not less than twenty years, nor more than
life imprisonment. The effect of this is that the persistent felon who
committed a Class B offense will be sentenced as if he had committed a
Class A felony, with the one exception that he cannot be sentenced to
death. If the offender is convicted of either a Class C or a Class D
felony, he can be sentenced to not less than ten years, nor more than
twenty years in prison, the normal penalty for convictions of Class B
felonies.
This method of computing the extended sentence for an habitual
offender is an improvement over the existing law. At present, KRS §
481.190 provides that a person convicted of a second felony shall be
imprisoned for not less than double the time of the sentence under
the first conviction and that a person convicted of a third felony shall
be sentenced to life imprisonment. The Code, on the other hand, does
not permit greater penalties for the conviction of a second felony. The
drafters of the Code did not feel that a second felony conviction is
sufficient evidence that the offender is an habitual criminal. 64 More-
over, by dividing the possible extended sentences according to the
seriousness of the present offense, the Code achieves a more fair and
rational approach to punishing the individual offender. The present
habitual criminal statute does not consider the seriousness of the
necessary three felonies. Having been convicted of two prior felonies,
an offender convicted of a crime that would be a Class D felony in
the Code is subject to a sentence of life imprisonment. In fact, all
three convictions could be for relatively minor felonies and the penalty
would still be twenty years to life imprisonment. The persistent
felony offender section of the Code prevents such inequitable treatment
by relating the additional sentence to the degree of the latest, or
present, felony.
Finally, the legislators decided to retain the existing procedure
for determining whether a defendant should be sentenced as a
persistent felony offender. According to current practice, once the
defendant has been charged as an habitual criminal, the prosecutor
is allowed to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior felony
convictions at the trial of the present offense. Many fear that ad-
mitting the proof of these previous crimes is prejudicial to the de-
63 KYPC § 267(4) [KRS § 435.1-080(4)].
G4 LRC § 3445 Commentary. Accord, ABA, SENTNCIN ALTERNATivES, supra
note 6, at § 3.3(b)(i).
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fendant in that evidence of past convictions might be used to convict
him on the present charges.65 Indeed, the final draft of the Code
required a separate hearing to determine the applicability of the
persistent felony sanctions after the defendant is found guilty and
sentenced for the present crime.66 Yet, just as it rejected the proposal
for separate sentencing proceedings where the death penalty or life
imprisonment without parole are possible, 7 the General Assembly
apparently concluded that the present method for invoking the
persistent felony statute is adequate and thus deleted from the Code
the provision for a separate hearing. Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals has defended the present procedure and has resisted pleas
to install by judicial decree the method suggested by the drafters of
the Code.68
Once the defendant is found guilty and the sentence is returned,
the jury's work is finished. At this point, the burden of making several
important decisions regarding the disposition of the offender shifts to
the trial judge. Among these decisions are: whether to modify the
jury's sentence of imprisonment; whether sentences should run con-
currently or consecutively in cases where the defendant has been
convicted of multiple offenses; whether the defendant should be placed
on probation or conditional discharge; and whether a fine should be
imposed in addition to the grant of probation or conditional discharge.
These alternatives make the judge a powerful force in the correctional
process. In fact, the new Penal Code anticipates the increased par-
ticipation of trial judges in the sentencing process.
To fulfill this role, trial judges must be willing to utilize the sen-
tencing alternatives which they have at their disposal. A determination
of the proper disposition for an offender requires that full and ac-
curate information about that offender be made available to the court.
Since there is little opportunity at trial to gather all the information
relevant to sentencing the defendant, the presentence report is an
indispensable source of information for the trial judge. 9 According
65 See ABA, SENrENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at § 5.5, Commentary
a-c at 258-66. This procedure, nevertheless, has been upheld by the Supreme
Court in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
66 LRC § 3445(1).
67 See text accompanying note 44 supra.
68See Cole v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.2d 753 (Ky. 1966); Wilson v. Com-
monwealth, 403 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1966).69 The MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07, Comment at 53 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954)
states: "The use and full development of this device appear to us to offer greatest
hope for the improvement of judicial sentencing." See also ABA, SEnr-NCING
ALTrNATrVES, supra note 6, at § 4.1, Commentary a-d at 201-08; PRESMENT's
CommissioN, THE CHALLENGE OF Camsm, supra note 1, at 144.
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to KYPC § 265 [KRS § 485A.1-050], before imposing sentence for
conviction of a felony, the court must order a presentence investigation
and must give due consideration to the written report of such in-
vestigation. 70 This report is prepared by a probation officer and in-
cludes information relevant to the sentencing decision, such as the
defendant's history of delinquency or criminality, family background,
physical and mental condition, education, and occupation. 71 This
section also empowers the court to order the defendant to submit to
psychiatric examination and observation for a period not to exceed
sixty days.7 2 With data supplied by the presentence report, and per-
haps a psychiatric report, the trial judge should be able to make an
informed decision as to the proper disposition of the offender.
Controversy surrounds the issue of whether the contents of the
presentence report should be disclosed to the defendant. Those who
oppose disclosure argue that confidential sources of information would
dry up, that the working relationship between the offender and the
probation officer would be disrupted, that individuals and social
agencies would be less willing to cooperate with probation authorities,
and that the sentencing process would be prolonged. 73 On the other
hand, the proponents of disclosure claim that fundamental fairness
requires that defendants be given the opportunity to refute damaging
information which may be based entirely on hearsay.74 Moreover,
they assert that by disclosing the information which forms the basis
for the sentence and allowing the defendant to participate in the
process of setting his penalty, the offender will better understand the
court's action, the first step toward rehabilitation.75 Both sides of this
debate contain merit. Most jurisdictions and the federal courts, 76 leave
the decision of disclosure to the discretion of the court, while only a
70 The present statute KRS 439.280, only requires a presentence report
when the defendant is to be placed on probation. The drafters have concluded
that such a report is necessary in all felony convictions. This is basically in accord
with MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Some authorities
suggest that a presentence report should be supplied in all cases. See ABA,
SENr=cING ALTErNATIVEs, supra note 6, at § 4.1; Pmimzr's CoMmssoN, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 144.
71KYPC § 265(2) [KRS § 435A.1-050(2)].
72KYPC § 265(3) [KRS § 435A.1-050(3)]. See generally Campbell, Sen-
tencing: The Use of Psychiatric Information and Presentence Reports, 60 Ky. L.J.
285 (1972).7 3 See F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO CommcnONs 21 (1969); Zastrow,
Disclosure of the Presentence Investigation Report, 35 FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1971,
at 20, 21.7 4 P1IusmENT's CoMIISIoN, THE CHALLENGE OF CRuMr, supra note 1, at 144;
ABA, SENTENCING ALTERNATvES, supra note 6, at § 4.4.7 5 Zastrow, Disclosure of the Presentence Investigation Report, supra note 73,
at 21.
76 FED. R. Crmx. P. 32(c) (2).
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small number of states require that the presentence report be turned
over to the defendant. 77
KYPC § 265 [KRS § 485A.1-050] adopts the modem approach of
compromise.78 Accordingly, the court is obligated to advise the de-
fendant or his attorney of the factual contents and conclusions of any
presentence investigation or psychiatric examination. Furthermore,
the defendant must be given the time and opportunity to refute the
facts and conclusions contained in the report if he chooses. The court,
however, is not required to reveal the sources of confidential informa-
tion. Thus, while those who cooperate with the court and probation
officials are afforded anonymity and protection, and, consequently,
the fear that these sources might dry up is laid to rest, the defendant
is treated fairly by being aware of the factors which the court must
weigh in reaching a decision and by being able to participate in the
sentencing process. Undoubtedly, the presentence procedure of the
new Code will achieve favorable results.
Except for his power to probate the defendant's sentence, the most
illustrative example of the trial judge's role in the disposition of the
offender is where he must decide whether sentences for multiple con-
victions should run concurrently or consecutively. Indeed, the stated
objective of KYPC § 270 [KRS § 435A.1-110] is to provide the trial
judge with as much flexibility as possible in determining sanctions.79
Thus, with just three exceptions which are new to the law in Ken-
tucky,80 the court is given discretion to rule whether multiple sentences
should be served concurrently or consecutively.81
The first situation in which the court has no discretion is where
the defendant has been sentenced to both definite and indeterminate
terms of imprisonment. The Code provides that in such cases service
of the indeterminate term shall satisfy the definite term sentence.
Since the goal of indeterminate sentences is the rehabilitation of the
offender, he would not benefit from further punishment in a local jail
upon his release from the state correctional institution. 2 A second
exception is that the aggregate of consecutive definite terms cannot
77 See ABA, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at § 4.3, Commentary a
at 211-12. See also Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 681 (1971).7
sThis is the approach adopted by the MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07(5) (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962). See also Thomsen, Confidentiality of the Presentence
Report: A Middle Position, 28 FED. PROBATION, March 1964, at 8.
79 LRC § 3460, Commentary.
8o Id.; Ky. R. Crm. P. 11.04 states that "[i]f two or more sentences are im-
posed, the judgment shall state whether they are to be served concurrently or
consecutively."'
81 This section of the new Code follows substantially MODEL PENAL CODE §
7.06 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
82 LRC § 3460, Commentary. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.06, Comment at 50
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
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exceed one year. Since deterrence is the only justification for confine-
ment in a local jail, one year in such an institution should accomplish
that result.8 The third exception applies to convictions for multiple
felony offenses. The aggregate of indeterminate terms cannot exceed
the maximum sentence which the offender could have received under
the persistent felony statute for the most serious crime for which he
stands convicted. For example, if the offender is convicted of three
felonies, the most serious of which is a Class C felony, the aggregate
of consecutive sentences cannot be more than twenty years. These
limitations on the aggregation of consecutive terms do not apply where
one commits a crime while in prison, during an escape from prison, or
while waiting to serve a sentence. The Code specifically provides
that under such circumstances any sentence may be added to the
offender's present term. This avoids the possibility that an individual
would have nothing to lose by commission of another offense.
One other major change in the existing law is made by this section.
When the trial court fails to indicate whether multiple sentences
should run concurrently or consecutively, the present rule is that they
should be served consecutively. 84 The Code, however, reverses this
approach. Unless the court specifically rules to the contrary, all sen-
tences run concurrently.8- If the more severe penalty of consecutive
sentences is to be imposed, the trial judge must clearly indicate that
this is his intent.86
The trial judge may, within limitations, modify a sentence of
imprisonment for a felony. 7  Once the jury has designated the
maximum sentence, the judge has the options of granting probation
or conditional discharge or reducing the maximum sentence. If the
judge determines that imprisonment is warranted but that the max-
imum term fixed by the jury is too harsh, he may modify the sentence,
imposing some lesser maximum term within the statutory limits for
the particular crime. If, for example, the jury sentences an individual
convicted of a Class B felony to the maximum twenty years in prison,
the trial court may reduce this sentence to some other term not less
than ten years. Further, the trial court has the power to reduce the
sentence for a Class D felony conviction to a term of one year or less
in a local penal institution. The importance of this section is that the
83 LRC § 3460, Commentary.
s4 Beasley v. Wingo, 432 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1968); Russell v. Commonwealth,
405 S.W.2d 683 (Ky. 1966).85 KYPC § 270(2) [KRS § 435A.1-110(2)].86 See LRC § 3460, Commentary.8 7 KYPC § 266 [KRS § 435A.1-070]. This power in the Court is also recog-
nized in MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.12 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) and in ABA,
SENTENCING ALTEnNATivES, supra note 6, at § 3.7.
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increased alternatives prevent the judge from having to make an all
or nothing choice between imposing the jury's sentence or granting
probation where neither is appropriate. 8
Probation and Conditional Discharge
Next to the death penalty, probation is probably the most vigor-
ously debated and least understood aspect of our system of criminal
justice. Most laymen and many members of the legal profession mis-
conceive the nature and utility of probation as a correctional tool.
Not a mere gratuity bestowed upon criminals by lenient or weak trial
judges, probation is a legitimate device for the treatment and re-
habilitation of offenders; consequently, it should be given as much
consideration in the sentencing decision as the more common forms
of punishment, imprisonment and fines.8 9 Clearly not every offender
should be probated anymore than every offender should be imprisoned,
yet modern concepts of sentencing requite that the possibility of
probation be explored in almost every case.9°
In most cases, especially where youthful offenders are involved,
probation is to be preferred over imprisonment. Probation is founded
on the premise that the best place to accomplish rehabilitation is
within the individuars own community, rather than in the abnormal,
anti-social environment of a prison. Under the guidance and super-
vision of probation officials, the offender can live and work under
relatively normal conditions. Since he will eventually return to his
community, a period of closely supervised probation will better pre-
pare the offender to be a productive, law-abiding member of that
community than will incarceration, isolated from the society in which
he must learn to live.91
It becomes even more apparent that many offenders should
receive probation when the alternative, imprisonment, is examined.
The impact of prison is catastrophic. The individual is physically and
psychologically removed from society and the supportive influences
of friends and family, banished into a surrealistic world from which
he will probably emerge more dangerous than before.9 2 This is
88 LRC § 3435, Commentary.
89 See ABA, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO PROBATION 1 (Approved Draft, 1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA,
STANDADS RELATING TO PROBATION]; NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE As-
SOCIATION, GUIDES FOR SENTENCING 13 (1957).
0 See ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION, supra note 89, at 1-2.
91Id.; PRESIDENT'S COMMiSSioN, THE CHALLENGE OF CnM, supra note 1, at
165; Moreland, Model Penal Code, supra note 22, at 70.
92 See ABA, STANDARmS RELATING TO PROBATION, supra note 89, at 1-2; PAES-
DENT'S CoMMIssIoN, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 159, 165.
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particularly debilitating for young offenders and supports the argu-
ment that they should be granted probation whenever possible. More-
over, the effects of a prison sentence remain with a man long after he
is released, for it is a stigma which he will carry for the rest of his life.93
Further, the price of keeping a man in prison is high, both in terms
of economic cost and waste of human resources. It is expensive to
house, feed, and guard the inmates of these institutions. 94 Then there
is the less obvious, but no less real, cost to society when the head
of a household is imprisoned and unable to support his family. A well
organized and properly staffed probation system would require the
expenditure of a considerable amount of public funds, but not as
much as is spent in keeping the offender imprisoned; and, at least while
on probation the individual can support himself and his dependants. 95
The legislature implicitly recognized the serious effect that im-
prisonment has on an individual by enacting the controversial "shock
probation" law.96 This statute, which will remain in force after the
Code becomes effective, empowers the trial judge to grant probation
to an offender after he has served at least thirty days in jail or prison.
The theory underlying this statute is that for many people a brief
stay in a penal institution will operate as a sufficient deterrent. Once
the offender has been exposed to prison, he is released on probation
to be rehabilitated within the community. This is a very useful cor-
rectional tool since it enables the trial court to place the offender in
prison without forfeiting the power to grant probation if it is later
determined that the individual has learned a lesson and will not bene-
fit from further confinement. Under former law, the trial court could
not grant probation after the offender had been turned over to the
Department of Corrections.97 The one foreseeable danger which "shock
probation" entails is that trial courts might too readily sentence an
offender to prison with the intention of subsequently granting pro-
bation when any length of imprisonment for that particular person
would be inappropriate.
The new Penal Code adopts a modem approach to the use of pro-
bation as a correctional device. Several changes in the law indicate
a determination by the drafters that probation should be more fre-
93 Moreland, Model Penal Code, supra note 22, at 70.
94 See note 2 supra; See also ABA, SENTENCING ALTERNATIvES, supra note 6,
at § 2.3, Commentary e at 73.95 ABA, SENTENCING ALTERNATIvEs, supra note 6, at § 2.3, Commentary e at
73; ABA, STANDARDs RELATING TO PROBATION, supra note 89, at § 1.2, Com-
mentary at 29-30.
96 KRS § 439.265.
9 7 See Commonwealth v. Fanelli, 445 S.W.2d 126 (Ky. 1969); Woll v. Com-
monwealth, 146 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1940).
19731
KENTUCKY LAW JouRiNAL.[o.6
quently utilized in sentencing. KYPC § 272 [KRS § 435A.2-010] pro-
vides that anyone convicted of a crime who is not sentenced to death
or life imprisonment without privilege of parole may be granted pro-
bation or conditional discharge. Thus, probation is an authorized
alternative to imprisonment for even the most serious crimes. This
section does not suggest that dangerous criminals be let loose on
society, but merely that there may be circumstances where one con-
victed of even a Class A felony should not be sentenced to prison.98
However, the most important change in this area is contained in
KYPC § 272(2) [KRS § 435A.2-010(2)] wherein the trial court is
required to consider the possibility of probation or conditional dis-
charge before imposing sentence. Furthermore, this section provides
that, after considering factors such as the defendant's background,
character, and the nature and circumstances of the crime, probation
or conditional discharge should be granted unless imprisonment is
deemed necessary for the protection of the public. There are but
three situations in which the protection of the public would require
imprisonment: where there is substantial risk that the defendant will
commit another crime while on probation, where the defendant is in
need of correctional treatment which can best be provided by com-
mitment to an institution, or where the granting of probation would
unduly depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime.99 Re-
quiring the judge to consider probation as the desired disposition of
the offender is a reversal of the present practice in the trial courts.
This current reluctance to grant probation is largely due to miscon-
ceptions of the nature and purpose of this sentencing alternative.
Many still view probation as a matter of grace conferred by the court,
rather than a correctional tool that should be implemented when the
circumstances warrant it.100 Worse yet, there are some who refuse
to grant probation even in the most obvious cases.' 01 Clearly, the Code
calls for more liberal use of this sentencing alternative.
98 See LRC § 3505, Commentary.
99 KYPC § 272 [KRS § 435A.2-010]; See ABA, STANmADAS RELATING TO
PROBATION, supra note 89, at § 1.3(a) (i)-(iii).
100 See King v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Ky. 1971), wherein
the Court stated:
Whether probation should be granted in any particular case is a
question addressing itself to the discretion of the trial court. When
granted, it is a matter of grace and not of right.
101 In Wyatt v. Ropke, 407 S.W.2d 410 (Ky. 1966), the trial judge was
ordered to vacate the bench where he bad stated that under no circumstances
would he suspend or probate the sentence of one convicted of armed robbery.
The Court of Appeals, while recognizing that the trial judge is vested with dis-
cretion in the decision whether to probate, stated that in any case the judge must
at least exercise such discretion by considering the possibility of probation.(Continued on next page)
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When the court determines that imprisonment is inappropriate, it
must either place the offender on probation or sentence him to con-
ditional discharge, attaching whatever conditions are deemed neces-
sary to help the defendant lead a law-abiding life. Probation shall be
imposed when the individual is in need of supervision, guidance, or
assistance. 102  Conditional discharge should be the sentence when
probationary supervision is considered unnecessary.10 3 Prior to the
expiration of the term of probation or conditional discharge, which
may not exceed five years in the case of felonies or two years for
misdemeanors, the court may modify or enlarge the conditions or
may revoke the sentence upon commission of another offense or upon
a violation of the terms of the sentence.'0 4 Upon revocation of
probation or conditional discharge, for whatever reason, the defendant
shall be imprisoned.10 5
The conditions which may be affixed to a sentence of probation or
conditional discharge are enumerated in KYPC § 274 [KRS § 435A.2-
030]. A few of the more important include: that the defendant work
at suitable employment, that he remain in a specified area, that he
report to a probation officer, that he permit the probation officer to
visit him in his home, that he avoid disreputable persons or places,
and that he make restitution for any loss resulting from his offense.
Not intended to be an exhaustive list, the court may impose any
other reasonable condition. Every grant of probation or conditional
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
A classic example of a situation where the trial court refused to probate an
offender who clearly qualified for probation can be found in Jordan v. Common-
wealth, 371 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1963).
102 KYFC § 273(1) [KRS § 435A.2-020(1)].
103 KYPC § 273(2) [KRS § 435A.2-020(2)]. The sentence of conditional
discharge is technically new to the criminal law of Kentucky, although courts have
recognized this correctional device under the label of a "suspended sentence."
LRC § 3510, Commentary.
104 KYPC § 273 [KRS § 435A.2-020]. This section represents a change from
existin law, KRS § 439.270 which limits the probationary period to five years
regardless of whether the offense is a felony or a misdemeanor. In Lanham v.
Commonwealth 353 S.W.2d 201 (Ky. 1962), the Court ruled that it was not
unconstitutiona to extend the period of probation beyond the length of the de-
fendant's prison sentence.105 When probation or conditional discharge is revoked, the Court must
impose a sentence of imprisonment. See LRC § 3510, Commentary. The Court,
however, cannot impose a greater sentence upon such revocation t hatdetermined by the jury. Hord v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1970).
KYPC § 276(2) [KRS § 435A.2-050(2)] establishes the procedure whch the
court must followv in revoking or modifying a sentence of probation or conditional
discharge. The offender must be given written notice of the grounds for revocationor modification, and a hearing must be held at which the defendant must be
represented by counsel. These steps satisfy minimum due process requirements.LRC § 3525, Commentary. See generally ABA, S§AnnS BAnG To Pao-
'ATION, supra note 89. at § 5.4, Commentary at 65-71.
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discharge must contain the explicit condition that the defendant not
commit another offense during the term of such sentence. 0 6
Another important rehabilitative device authorized by the Code is
popularly known as the "split sentence."10 7 KYPC § 274 [KRS §
435A.2-030 (4)] enables the trial court to require the offender to sub-
mit to periodic imprisonment in the county jail as a condition of pro-
bation or conditional discharge. These periods of imprisonment may
be whenever and for as long as the court considers necessary to
further the offender's program of rehabilitation. However, the total
length of confinement under a split sentence cannot exceed six months
or the length of his original sentence, whichever is shorter.
The advantages of this provision should be obvious. The trial
judge is given the necessary flexibility to treat the criminal individually
and to structure a program of probation which will ensure, as far as
possible, that the offender will adhere to the other conditions of his
sentence. Thus, it is envisioned that the man with a job could be
released during working hours or could be required to spend his
weekends in jail.'08 This statute, like the one authorizing "shock
probation," also allows the judge to give the defendant a taste of
imprisonment without turning him over to the Department of Cor-
rections or to the local jail to serve his entire sentence. Undoubtedly,
the inclusion of this sentencing alternative within the Code is an
improvement over the existing law and adds another important
dimension to the role of the trial judge in the process of treating con-
victed criminals.
Fines
The use of fines as a criminal sanction is very common, especially
for less serious offenses. Penologically, a fine is an effective deterrent,
at least for those who can afford to pay, and is an economical sub-
stitute for imprisonment.10 9 For these reasons courts have long re-
106 This section is similar to the present statute, KRS § 439.290. The Code
provision, however, adds several conditions which may be imposed along with
probation. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.1 (Proposed Ofcial Draft 1962);
ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION, supra note 89, at § 3.2, Commentary at
45-50.
107 See LRC § 3515, Commentary. See generally Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 985(1955).
'6S See LRC § 3515, Commentary; ABA, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra
note 6, at § 2.4, Commentary a at 75-80. It is also noted that utilization of this
provision would be especially appropriate for youthful offenders.
Under present law, KRS § 439.179 such "release" programs are authorized in
misdemeanor cases. This statute is patterned after MODEL PENAL CODE § 303.9
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).109 Note, Imprisonment of Indigents for Non-payment of Fines or Court Costs;
The Need for Legislation that will Provide Protection to the Poor, 48 N.D.L. REv.
109 (1971).
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sorted to this form of punishment. However, much of the law regard-
ing the imposition of monetary penalties has had to be rewritten as a
result of recent Supreme Court decisions. The Code makes several
changes in the existing law to reflect the new constitutional imperatives
but nevertheless retains the use of fines as a sentencing alternative for
both misdemeanors and felonies.
In Tate v. Short" ° and Williams v. Illinois,"' the Supreme Court
held that a defendant may not be imprisoned for nonpayment of a fine
where his failure to pay is a result of indigency. In Williams, the
defendant was convicted of petty theft and received the maximum
sentence of one year's imprisonment and a $500 fine. Too poor to pay
the fine, Williams was required to remain in prison to satisfy the fine
at a rate of $5 per day. The Court held that the defendant was denied
his rights under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment by being forced to serve a sentence longer than the statutory
maximum solely because he was unable to pay the fine. The decision
in the Tate case extended this rule. In Tate the defendant was fined
$425 for numerous traffic convictions. Though the offenses for which
he was convicted did not carry a sentence of imprisonment, Texas law
permitted an offender to be incarcerated in order to pay off his fine
at a rate of $5 per day. Since the defendant, an indigent, was unable
to pay the fine, he was placed in jail. The Court held that this was
discrimination which violated the defendant's equal protection rights
since he was subject to imprisonment solely because he was indigent.
The effect of these decisions on the use of fines as a penalty is far-
reaching. No longer may a defendant who is unable to pay be im-
prisoned for nonpayment." 2 This result is sound. It is unfair that a
poor man should have to go to jail when, under the same circum-
stances, a person with more wealth can avoid this fate merely by pay-
ing the fine. More importantly, if the defendant is sitting in jail, he is
unable to earn any income whatsoever; therefore, he can neither pay
the fine nor support his dependents. Finally, where the individual is
unable to pay, imprisonment for nonpayment of fines is inconsistent
with any goal of punishment. If the man cannot pay, jail is neither a
deterrent nor a rehabilitative process.113 The only situation where
imprisonment is warranted for nonpayment of a fine is where the
11o 401 U.s. 395 (1971).
"'399 U.S. 235 (1970).
112 The Kentucky Court of Appeals has followed the decisions in Tate v. Short
and Williams v. Illinois in the case of Spurlock v. Noe, 467 S.W.2d 320 (Ky. 1971).
"




defendant willfully refuses to pay.114 The decisions in Tate and Williams
do not preclude imprisonment of a defendant who, though able, does
not pay his fine.
These Supreme Court decisions do not mean that the states may
not enforce the payment of fines; indeed, in both opinions the Court
suggested alternative methods for collecting fines from indigents.115
The Kentucky Penal Code includes several alternatives. KYPC § 273
[KRS § 435A.8-020] authorizes the court to allow payment within a
specified period of time or in specified installments. 116 This affords
the court enough flexibility to accommodate even the poorest man's
budget. This method of enforcing fines not only increases the amount
of revenue that will be collected, but also maximizes the deterrent
effect.117 This section also prohibits the court from fixing an alterna-
tive, contingent sentence of imprisonment in case the fine is not paid
at the same time the fine is imposed. Thus, the "$30 or 30 days" sen-
tence which was ruled unconstitutional, at least when applied to in-
digents, is no longer permitted."18
In accordance with the decision in Tate v. Short, the Code includes
a procedure for sanctioning those who fail or refuse to pay their fines
which is fair to those who are unable to pay but which penalizes those
who merely refuse to pay. KYPC § 282 [KRS § 435A.3-060] states that
when a defendant defaults in payment of a fine or any installment, the
court on its own motion or that of the prosecutor may order the de-
fendant to show cause why he should not be imprisoned for nonpay-
ment. If the court finds that the defendant's default is attributable to
an intentional refusal to obey or to a lack of good faith in his effort to
obtain the necessary funds, he may be imprisoned for a term not
exceeding: (1) six months, if fine was for a felony; (2) one-third of
the maximum authorized term of imprisonment for the offense com-
mitted, if the fine was for a misdemeanor; or (3) ten days, if the fine
was for a violation. On the other hand, if the default is deemed excus-
114 See Note, Imprisonment of Indigents for Non-payment of Fines or Court
Costs; The Need for Legislation that will Provide Protection to the Poor, supra note
109, at 129.
115 See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 400 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235, 244-45 (1970).116 The installment payment method for collecting fines has been adopted in
MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) and in ABA,
SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at § 2.7(b). See also Comment, Install-
ment Payments: A Solution to the Problem of Fining Indigents, 24 U. FLA. L. REv.
166 (1971).117 See Note, Imprisonment of Indigents for Non-payment of Fines or Court
Costs; The Need for Legislation that will Provide Protection to the Poor, supra note
109, at 125.118 See LRC § 3605, Commentary. See also ABA, SErTENcmG ALTERNATIVES,
supra note 6 at § 2.7, Commentary f at 127.
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able, the court may extend the time for payment, reduce the amount
of the installments, or otherwise modify the manner of payment. Fur-
ther, if the defendant's default was innocent, the court may under
certain conditions, compel the defendant to work for a department of
local government and order that up to forty percent of his compen-
sation be paid toward his fine. This provision should maximize the
deterrent and rehabilitative effect of fines." 9
The Code authorizes the imposition of fines in felony convictions,
but limits the amount and use of this form of punishment. This reflects
the modern theory that fines have limited utility as a correctional tech-
nique.120 Thus KYPC § 279 [KRS § 485A.8-030] authorizes imposition
of a fine only after the defendant has been granted probation or con-
ditional discharge and restricts the amount to not more than $10,000
or double the defendant's gain from the commission of the offense.
Since probation or conditional discharge is a prerequisite to use of
this sentence, a jury may not impose a fine in a felony case. This is
consistent with the view that fines should not be used as a matter of
course in felony convictions. Further, a jury would not have sufficient
information before them to properly administer such penalties.' 2 1
This section also prescribes certain factors which the court must
consider in determining the amount and method of payment of the
fine.12 2 First, the court must evaluate the defendant's ability to pay
and the hardship imposed on his dependents by the amount of the fine
and the method of payment. Fines should be imposed only on those
who have the ability to pay. This approach is dictated by the Supreme
Court's decisions in Williams and Tate. Indeed, since little action can
be taken against an offender who in good faith cannot pay his fine, it
would be futile for the trial court to impose a fine which clearly exceeds
the defendant's means. Furthermore, the drafters of the Code have
accepted the principle that the amount of the fine should not cause
the defendant's family to suffer; therefore, the court must consider the
impact of the fine on his dependents.
The court is also required to consider the effect of a fine on the
defendant's ability to make restitution or reparation to the victim of
his crime. Certainly, the court should not, by imposing a fine that
19 KYPC § 3625, Commentary. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.2 (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962).
120 In fact it has been suggested that fines be authorized only in cases where
the defendant has received gain from the commission of his crime. ABA,
SENTENCING ALTERNATivEs, supra note 6, at § 2.7, Commentary d at 124-25.
121 See LRC § 3610, Commentary.
122 KYPC § 279(3) [KRS § 435A.3-030(3)]. These factors are also stated in
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) and in ABA, SEN-
TENCiNG ALTERNATivES, supra note 6, at § 2.7(c).
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exhausts the defendant's resources, deprive the defendant's victim of
compensation for any loss incurred. Moreover, the court should always
consider what gain an offender may have derived from his crime. Fines
are most appropriate where the individual has profited from commis-
sion of the offense. Indeed, it has been suggested that this is the only
situation where the sentence of a fine for felony convictions is proper.'23
Since the justification for fines is their deterrent effect, they are
more appropriately utilized for misdemeanor convictions.124 KYPC §
280 [KRS § 435A.3-040] provides that for any crime defined within the
Code, other than a felony, the offender may be sentenced to pay a fine
not to exceed: $500 for a Class A misdemeanor; $250 for a Class B
misdemeanor; or $250 for a violation. Unlike the procedure in felony
cases, the sentence of a fine for a misdemeanor can be rendered by
the jury in the same manner as a sentence of imprisonment.125 In fact,
the legislators, presumably for the sake of clarity, added a provision
which states specifically that the jury may levy a fine in addition to or
in lieu of a sentence of imprisonment for misdemeanor convictions. 20
The Code makes special provision for fines against a corporation . 2 7
KYPC § 281 [KRS § 435A.3-050] establishes the maximum amount
which may be assessed against a corporation convicted of a crime
defined by the Code: $20,000 for any felony; $10,000 for a Class A
misdemeanor; $5,000 for a Class B misdemanor; $500 for a violation;
or, double the amount of the defendant corporation's gain from the
commission of the offense. This section also limits the maximum
penalty for offenses defined outside the Code. This is accomplished
by determining within which Code classification the offense would fall
based on the maximum sentence of imprisonment authorized by that
statute. Thus, if an offense defined the Code carries a possible sen-
tence of imprisonment of not more than twelve months nor less than
ninety days, it would be comparable to a Class A misdemeanor under
the Code and the corporation could be fined up to $10,000.
123 See note 119, supra.
124LRC § 3615, Commentary.
125 Id.
126=KYPC § 279(1) [KRS § 435A.3-030(1)]. It is not clear why this addition
to the original Code draft, concerning the use of fines in misdemeanors, has been
inserted in the section dealing with fines in felony cases.
More significantly, the language of this added section is vague and could be
construed to authorize the "thirty dollars or thirty days" type sentence. However
in light of the decision in Tate v. Short, such sentences should not be utilized; and
indeed, it was the intention of the drafters of the Code that this type of sentence
should be abolished. LRC § 3610, Commentary.
127 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.07, 6.04 (Proposed Official Draft
1962); Hamilton, Corporate Criminal Liability in Texas, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 60(1968); 19 Am. Jur.2d Corporations §§ 1434-40 (1965).
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Conclusion
While retaining some major aspects of the present law such as jury
sentencing, the Kentucky Penal Code makes very significant changes
in the disposition of criminal offenders. Indicative of the improve-
ments contained in the sections dealing with the authorized dispositions
of offenders is the rational classification of all offenses, the power
given the court to modify jury sentences, and the increased emphasis
on probation and conditional discharge as an alternative to imprison-
ment. By enacting these provisions, the General Assembly has pro-
vided the tools to achieve a more just and effective system of criminal
sentencing. Now, it is the responsibility of the bar and the courts to
implement these provisions skillfully and in the progressive spirit in
which they were enacted.
Gregory M. Bartlett
